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ABSTRACT: This article discusses the competencies Australia’s
political and military leaders selected to pursue offset strategies and
anti-access/area denial capabilities.

A

ustralia’s physical security is in large part achieved as a function
of its geography. As the world’s largest island sitting astride the
Pacific, Indian, and Southern Oceans, Terra Australis Incognita
and its inhabitants have traditionally sought comfort in being located
“at the bottom of the world.”1 Australians were jolted out of this false
notion and realized their physical vulnerability when Japan suddenly
captured Singapore in 1942. Since then, Australian security planners
have emphasized the importance of possessing the military capability to
operate across the sea-air gap to the north of the continent. The Australia
in the Asian Century white paper elevated this issue: “As the global centre
of gravity shifts to our region, the tyranny of distance is being replaced
with the tyranny of proximity.”2
The Australian Defence Force focuses much of its effort on
developing the means to operate in major theaters of confl ict as well as
to maintain regional access and engagement as part of a layered approach
to national security, including continental defense. This approach
also acknowledges Australia’s reliance on its most important security
treaty—the ANZUS Pact (1951).3 One of this alliance’s most interesting
challenges is ensuring the continuity of global commerce systems in
the Asia-Pacific, which requires common access to realize the potential
benefits. This aspect has underpinned the region’s stability for at least
the past 70 years. Today, however, access across the global commons is
increasingly problematic due to political, environmental, and diplomatic
issues. To guarantee continued common access and security in the region,
the Australian Defence Force is expanding its network of parties who
likewise value developing capabilities and concepts to defeat adversarial
anti-access/area denial (A2/AD) threats.

1 For more on Australia’s Maritime culture, see Michael Evans, “The Third Way: Towards an
Australian Maritime Strategy for the Twenty-first Century,” in 2013 Chief of Army History Conference:
Armies and Maritime Strategy, ed. Peter Dennis (Canberra: Big Sky Publishing, 2013), 327–58.
2 Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet (PM&C), Australia in the Asian Century,
White Paper 1 (Barton, Australia: PM&C, 2012), 105. The white paper also detailed six key drivers
for developing Australia’s security environment through 2035: the roles of and relationship
between the United States and China; competitive states’ challenges to the stability of the
rules-based global order; terrorist threats; state fragility resulting from economics, crime, social
factors, environment, governing, and climate change; military modernization; and complex,
nongeographic threats such as cyber.
3 The Australia, New Zealand, United States Security (ANZUS) Pact initially bound the parties
to cooperate on security matters in the Pacific Ocean region. Today the treaty relates to conflicts
worldwide: an armed attack on any of the three parties would be met as a common threat.
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Anti-Access/Area Denial

Anti-access challenges—geographic, military, and diplomatic—are
designed to prevent, delay, or degrade the ability of military forces
to enter an operational area and establish bases farther away from
preferred locations.4 Limiting an opponent to an inland operational
area, for example, creates great distance from ports and usable airfields,
presenting a geographic challenge.5 In other cases, anti-access challenges
are diplomatic or political matters, such as when a nation in a region
prohibits or limits the ability of a military operation to deploy joint task
forces into its sovereign territory or to fly through its airspace.
Area denial refers to actions designed to restrict freedoms
of maneuver, which are characterized by an adversary’s ability to
obstruct the actions of military forces once they have deployed. Land
forces deployed to Afghanistan in 2001, for example, encountered no
significant military area denial threats though forces deployed to the
region later in the confl ict regularly faced severe area denial threats such
as improvised explosive devices. In the maritime domain, sea mines and
other defensive measures effectively deny access to and use of maneuver
corridors (straits), harbors, and beach-landing sites.
The types of A2/AD threats the Australian Defence Force could
encounter in future operations will vary considerably. At the low-end
of the spectrum of confl ict, insurgent forces such as the Taliban in
Afghanistan or the Islamic State in Iraq and Syria have limited antiaccess capabilities and a small number of modern weapons. These forces
could still pose a considerable area denial challenge due to their ability
to operate among the local population and employ irregular tactics to
strike land forces at times and places of their choosing.
In the middle of the spectrum, hybrid opponents can employ
irregular or guerrilla-type tactics, but are reasonably well-armed with
modern weapons. Examples of these opponents, who can simultaneously
fight in a conventional manner, include the pairing of irregular Viet
Cong and regular North Vietnamese forces during the Vietnam War and
the Hezbollah forces that Israel fought in southern Lebanon in 2006.6
At the high end of the threat spectrum, armed forces of nationstates tend to employ conventional tactics and weapons. Even at this end
of the spectrum, the level of A2/AD capability can vary considerably. As
with the hybrid threat, this challenge is not new. In World War II, Nazi
Germany’s submarine force provided a potent, long-range anti-access
capability that threatened allied shipping routes across the North Atlantic
Ocean. Similarly, during the Cold War, a major mission of the Soviet
navy’s submarines was to interdict the movement of North Atlantic
Treaty Organization reinforcements from the United States to Europe.

4 John Gordon IV and John Matsumura, The Army’s Role in Overcoming Anti-Access and Area
Denial Challenges (Washington, DC: RAND Corporation, 2013), 21–23.
5 US Army Capabilities Integration Center (ARCIC) and US Marine Corps Combat
Development Command, Gaining and Maintaining Access: An Army–Marine Corps Concept
(Fort Eustis, VA: ARCIC, 2012), 3.
6 Frank G. Hoffman, “Hybrid Warfare and Challenges,” Joint Force Quarterly 52 (1st Quarter 2009).
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Oﬀset Strategy

Australia has, in comparison to other regional military forces,
a numerically modest capability to provide security over a significant
geographic area. To deter effectively and to provide military responses
to threats, the Australian Defence Force must compensate for its size
disadvantage by developing a competitive, asymmetrical strategy capable
of generating an advantage over potential adversaries. This type of
strategy usually centers on engineering cross-domain and technological
capabilities that effectively offset quantitative inferiority in regions
dominated by larger, more potent forces.
In its simplest form, an offset strategy is a competitive long-term
concept that generates and sustains strategic advantage.7 While not
an exclusively technological approach, the strategy does tend to have
a robust technical focus. Offset strategies strive for an appropriate
combination of technology and operational constructs to achieve
decision advantage, and in doing so bolster conventional deterrence.8
For the Australian Defence Force, who by any regional comparison will
always be a numerically small military, technology and military alliances
represent the most important combat multipliers that can generate the
military effects required to protect Australia and her national interests.
Force-on-force attrition is the end point of warfare, the least desired
operational scenario for military forces. The Australian Defence Force
seeks to generate operational outcomes by employing asymmetric effects;
it relies on tactics, technologies, personnel, and alliances—its inventory
of offset capabilities—to generate its military operations.

Oﬀset Capabilities for Asia-Pacific Access beyond 2020

To retain access and to defeat area denial systems in the Asia-Pacific,
the Australian Defence Force offset strategy concentrates on eight
core tactical competencies and concepts that, when combined with
cross-domain synergy, gives Australian and allied joint forces the edge
necessary for future military contests for access. These competencies are
at the heart of short-notice, rapid-response force success.

Competency 1: Electromagnetic Maneuver Warfare

Modern military ships, aircraft, and ground forces cannot effectively
operate without using the electromagnetic spectrum and have not been
able to do so for about a century. At a very minimum, communication
via radio—notwithstanding runners, pigeons, and easily cut telephone
cables—is necessary even in an emissions-controlled environment.
Today’s Australian forces constantly transmit and receive intelligence,
operational plans, and asset locations via wireless networks and other
communication and control systems. These systems must be protected
while their platforms and their sensor suites simultaneously deny the
electromagnetic spectrum from being used by any potential adversary.
7 Robert Martinage, Toward a New Offset Strategy: Exploiting U.S. Long-Term Advantages
to Restore U.S. Global Power Projection Capability (Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and
Budgetary Assessments, 2014), 14–20.
8 Wing Commander Phil Arms, “The U.S. 3rd Offset Strategy: An opportunity for
the ADF,” Australian Army, July 28, 2016, http://www.Army.gov.au/Our-future/Blog
/Articles/2016/07/Third-Offset-Strategy.
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Electromagnetic maneuver warfare is the concept of creating
an electromagnetic battle management system, where all individual
platforms collect data on and inform the network of enemy signals while
managing their own emissions to defeat, deceive, or deny the adversary
through offensive kinetic and nonkinetic operations. By unifying and
asserting positive control inside the electromagnetic spectrum—indeed
maneuvering inside the spectrum—numerically inferior forces have an
antedote for an adversary’s military forces. Moreover, electromagnetic
maneuver warfare does not only focus on the adversary, it also guarantees
access to the electromagnetic spectrum for joint forces’ command
and control, detection, force protection, and frequency management
capabilities. Supporting the ability for forces to maneuver across all
domains—air, maritime, land, space, cyber—as well as to control the
spectrum through denial, deception, and destruction, electromagnetic
maneuver warfare provides joint forces opportunities to operate
without attribution, which protects sensitive capabilities and maintains
operational security.

Competency 2: Technologically Intensive, Human Focused Decision-Making

Effective decision-making is critical to success in war. Colonel
John Boyd’s Observe, Orient, Decide, and Act (OODA) Loop was
designed as an organizing principle for strategy that anticipated and
embraced ambiguity and uncertainty, which he perceived as inherent
features of man and nature. The randomness of the outside world,
he felt, played a large role in uncertainty. Boyd further argued the
inability of military commanders to properly make sense of a constantly
changing reality is a bigger hindrance. Thus, he called for continuously
updating mental concepts by using both man and machine to deal with
a constantly changing reality.
Boyd’s OODA Loop emphasizes alertness—the ability to observe the
changing situation and environment. A follow-on focus of the changing
character of the situation allows a person to orient to the situation. Armed
with this perspective, one can decide to act based upon action alternatives
that inform subsequent OODA Loops via a continuous learning process.
While modern technology collects critical information to inform the
loop, the interpretation of such information remains an essential human
skill founded on the decision-maker’s personal experience and prior
preparation to understand the situation and the enemy. Boyd emphasized
an additional need for the commander’s intent to unify a force’s purpose
and preference for decentralized execution to ensure redundancy in
action, thereby increasing the chances of mission success.9
As a component of an offset strategy, decision-making is critical.
Embracing the OODA Loop allows the military to harness technologies
that support decision-making, which is emphasized during the
observe and orient phase, while preserving the human aspects of the
decide and act component.
The observe and orient focus within an offset strategy generates
superior situational understanding for commanders and joint forces to
ensure their ability to execute the key warfighting functions—know,
9 For more on John Boyd, see Robert Coram, Boyd: The Fighter Pilot Who Changed the Art of War
(New York: Bay Back Books, 2002).
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shape, strike, shield, sustain, and adapt.10 To achieve this perspective
and the ability to defeat complex systems such as an adversary’s A2/AD
capability, focus must be maintained on key intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance capabilities, which include electronic warfare,
electronic attack, persistent surveillance, supercomputing, autonomous
systems, and unmanned systems, as well as decision support systems
such as geoimagery, synthetic simulation, artificial intelligence, and
computer learning systems. Analytical technologies that determine
the alertness and character of problem-solving as well as analytical
functions such as data management and data analysis are also critical:
they enable processed and analyzed data to be presented as information
appropriately formatted for military forces to apply to the next phase of
the decision cycle—decide and act.
The decide and act function as part of an offset strategy requires
a centralized command and control system that emphasizes humanto-human interconnectedness and integrates Generation 5 capabilities
such as those being introduced into military service over the next
decade. Coupled with increased data processing technologies, including
accelerated analytics, the decide and act function is likely to rapidly
deliver patterns and correlations that were previously unidentified. A
more accurate and detailed data set would maximize the use of limited
capabilities such as low-density/high-demand intelligence, surveillance,
and reconnaissance systems as well as optimize the use of scarce resources
such as aviation and logistics. High performance analytics also present
an opportunity to derive value from big data, solve complex operational
problems, and deliver timely, high-quality insights for making decisions.

Competency 3: Integrated Air and Missile Defense Systems

An effective integrated air and missile defense system detects, tracks,
identifies, and monitors airborne objects, such as aircraft, helicopters,
unmanned aerial vehicles, and ballistic missiles, and if necessary,
intercepts them using surface-based or airborne weapons systems.
Integrated air and missile defense systems are key enablers for joint
force operations and encourage a system of cooperative engagement
emphasizing a fully integrated targeting network that designs kinetic
and nonkinetic solutions in an all-informed networked environment.
The systems’ capabilities provide effective air policing with a
deterrent effect in peacetime as well as preserve the actions necessary to
nullify or reduce the effectiveness of air and missile threats during times
of crisis and confl ict. Integrated air and missile defense systems provide a
highly responsive, time-critical, persistent capability to achieve a desired
or necessary level of air control that allows joint forces to conduct fullrange missions. They integrate a network of interconnected national and
battle command systems comprised of sensors, command and control
facilities, and weapons systems.

10 The combat and warfighting functions of know, shape, strike, shield, sustain, and
adapt, which were articulated by the Australian Army, in The Fundamentals of Land Warfare, Land
Warfare Doctrine (LWD) 1 (Canberra, ACT, Australia: Australian Army, 2008), were removed
in the 2014 version of the doctrine, but an oblique reference to these functions, which excludes
strike, remains in the following: Australian Army, Operations, LWD 3-0 (Laverton, Victoria:
Defence Publishing Service, 2015).
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A theater-level system is capable of combining sensor data in real
time to create a detailed, integrated picture of aircraft and missile threats
in the air that can be shared on an allied network to give friendly ships,
aircraft, and land mobile systems the ability to create an integrated air
defense. This capability is especially important for managing the threat
level of an A2/AD environment where the simultaneous targeting
of a multitude of anti-access systems is critical to overwhelming and
defeating the enemy network.
The advent of cheap, mass-produced, autonomous drones, which
have no centralized system but are capable of generating thousands of
air vectors that can overwhelm the processing power of an integrated
air and missile defense system, has become an emerging arms race. The
need for adaptive refresh capabilities and the avoidance of block or
system obsolescence will be essential to ensuring the systems remain
capable and effective.
Given the myriad of capability priorities for modern military
forces, including the Australian Defence Force, the development of
an interoperable, robust integrated air and missile defense system must
be seen in the context of cost-consciousness. System inceptors should
therefore be simple, relatively inexpensive, and employ a network
approach to engagement: the active defense versus missile attack cost
ratio should be reversed. System procurement should be managed
through a development process that allows organizations, including the
Australian Defence Force, an opportunity to leap to the end-state, thereby
leveraging the defense industry and Australia’s alliance frameworks.

Competency 4: Manned and Machine Teaming

Unmanned systems are changing the way all militaries operate and
protect forces. Exploration and expansion of these capabilities must be
continued while militaries remain conscious of low-technology threats,
such as drone technology, that effectively act as autonomous rounds of
ammunition. The success of an unmanned system in any domain is best
demonstrated by the way it integrates with manned activity and serves as
a combat multiplier, rather than a simple swap. Human-machine teaming
emphasizes this progression whether it occurs as tactical surveillance
in a war zone, support of a humanitarian operation, or movement of
supplies in a convoy.
The Australian Defence Force must invest additional resources
and effort in developing manned-machine systems that enhance
image-capture and sensor systems, positioning and navigation systems,
targeting and decision-support systems, and advanced simulation
systems. Advanced computing capabilities now allow systems to
communicate with teams of humans and other systems. Improvements
in affordable, portable, and long-lasting power sources also improve
system mobility and accelerate processing ability. Technologies on and
off any teamed platform will also help unmanned systems understand
tasks and how to respond to obstacles, weather conditions, and other
unknown interferences.
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Competency 5: Defended and Defending Communications Networks

The Australian Defence Force relies heavily on cyberspace to enable
its military, intelligence, and logistics operations, including the movement
of personnel and matériel and the command and control of the full
spectrum of military operations. Exploitation of cybervulnerabilities
could undermine the force’s ability to operate, thereby threatening
national security and competitiveness. Recent government investments
in cybersecurity have improved the posture of networks, systems, and
data by reducing attack surfaces and improving control over information
access. Results include enhancements in cybersecurity measures and
situational awareness, such as monitoring for intrusions, mitigating
vulnerabilities, improving identity management and authentication,
and central collection of incident data; however, cyberthreats are
increasing and adversaries are becoming more skilled, sophisticated, and
strategically minded. The Australian Defence Force must ensure it does
not overlook the vulnerability of cyberassets.
To meet the challenges expected between now and 2020,
transformational changes to cyberculture, workforce, technology,
policy, and processes of the Australian Defence Force are required. The
results of this strategy will enable the organization to continue to operate
effectively in cyberspace, as well as actively defend against adversarial
cyberactions. This strategy should emphasize establishing a resilient
defense posture, transforming the management of all deployments and
operations, enhancing all situational awareness assets with a specific
focus on network integrity, and increasing assurance and survivability
against highly sophisticated attacks against core systems.11
To support these efforts, the Australian Defence Force will work
more closely with its interagency partners, the private sector, and
international partners toward collective cyberdefense. Most importantly,
the Australian cyberspace workforce will have to be fully trained,
equipped, and prepared for defending the cyberinterests of not only the
military but also Australian society in general. Although not addressed
as a critical element, each focus area will require development of related
policy, oversight, and compliance mechanisms to be successful.

Competency 6: Dark Systems

Survivability in a highly contested A2/AD environment demands
capabilities that can operate below adversaries’ detection threshold,
in other words, the capability to “go dark.” The Australian Defence
Force should develop stealth-like systems that include air, maritime,
and land platforms with the following design characteristics: acoustic
design features that reduce operating noise emissions and thermal
masking through equipment insulation, low emissivity paint, and radar
absorbent materials that reduce the probability of interception, as well
as metamaterial concealment and nonmagnetic construction materials.
Of significant note is the requirement to reduce a platform’s
electronic signature, use low-probability intercept transmissions, as well
as develop and implement mathematical and statistical algorithms for
allied and adversarial radio frequency signal detection, characterization,
11 US Department of Defense (DoD), DoD Strategy for Defending Networks, Systems, and
Data, (Washington, DC: DoD, 2013).
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and localization with a particular emphasis on wideband, multichannel,
and distributed sensors. This capability will not only help the Australian
Defence Force mask its communication signals but also improve its
ability to detect other signals within the operating environment.12

Competency 7: Anti-Position Navigation Timing Protection and Disruption
Systems

There is a growing awareness among modern militaries of the major
disruption risks to operations and capabilities that rely on GPS as the
only means of position determination and precision timing. Developed
in the 1970s by the US Department of Defense, GPS was created for
military navigation and is widely credited with America’s military
dominance during the Persian Gulf War (1990–91). Since that time,
the capability has become absolutely critical to military operations and
weapons systems as well as international commerce, which is critical to
the global economy. Thus, the Australian Defence Force must possess
both the ability to operate within a GPS degraded environment and to
deny effectively the use of the same system to an adversary. This ability
should increase space resiliency, hedge against the loss of space-based
enablers, and develop counterspace capabilities accordingly.
As part of its offset strategy, the Australian Defence Force should
pursue a robust and cost-effective solution to protect military capabilities
from GPS interference: high-performance GPS antijamming devices
that allow GPS receivers to acquire and track satellite signals so the
Australian Defence Force can retain the ability to determine accurate
battlefields positions.13 Alternatively, Australia may need to choose a
less direct approach such as ensuring systems can operate on multiple
systems such as an adversary’s primary Glonass or Beidou systems,
which would be less likely to be jammed.14 This redundancy in position
determination and precision timing capabilities does not currently exist.
Spoofing, a process of replacing correct GPS readings by creating
a false signal that leads devices to display incorrect times or locations,
could potentially disrupt power grids or hijack systems including weapon
platform and key maneuver systems.15 As an offensive capability, the
ability to deny GPS signals to an adversary would be an important
maneuver and attack tool, especially in a highly decentralized and longrange targeting confl ict such as an A2/AD environment with unmanned
systems and attack munitions whose core functions rely on the signal.16

Competency 8: Directed Energy Systems

With the groundbreaking test of a laser weapons system aboard the
USS Ponce in 2014, directed energy systems have never been closer to
12 “Spectrum Sensing and Shaping,” Australian Department of Defence Science and
Technology, http://www.dst.defence.gov.au/capability/spectrum-sensing-and-shaping (accessed
August 18, 2016).
13 NovAtel, Mitigating the Threat of GPS Jamming: Anti-Jam Technology (white paper,
Alberta, Canada: NovAtel, 2012).
14 Philip G. Mattos and Fabio Pisoni, “Quad Constellation Receiver: GPS GLONASS, Galileo,
BeiDou,” GPS World, January 1, 2014.
15 “The increasing risk of GPS systems,” Homeland Security NewsWire, November 22, 2011,
http://www.homelandsecuritynewswire.com/dr20111122-the-increasing-risks-of-gps-systems.
16 “China Unveils Anti-Drone Laser Weapon Able to Shoot Down ‘Small Aircraft’ within 5
Seconds,” RT, 2 November 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/201795-china-drone-defense-laser/.
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becoming integrated as fully operational military systems.17 An effective
capability that can block adversaries’ electronics and communications,
protect maritime and ground convoys in high risk zones, and protect
critical land, maritime, and airborne assets is crucial in defeating
future threats. Electromagnetic rail guns and directed energy missile
technologies are now fielded capabilities in some countries. Once
developed and deployed, these systems, such as the Tomahawk cruise
missile and the Javelin antitank missile, are relatively inexpensive.
While size, weight, interoperability, and lethality are factors, other
concerns, which mostly involve environmental extremes, limit directed
energy weapons. Traditional assault rifles are reliable in extreme tropical,
desert, and arctic conditions. They operate effectively in rain, snow,
dust, and fog. They can generally be immersed in water and covered
in mud without degrading their performance, and unlike directed
energy systems, assault rifles are not negatively affected by solar flares or
electromagnetic pulses.
A directed energy weapon relies on a sophisticated electronic circuit
to generate an energy beam, which can be isolated and shielded from
outside influence but not without adding weight and sophistication.
Clouds, fog, rain, and snow are all enemies of directed energy. Today’s
powerful antimissile airborne systems simply burn their way through
targets, but lower-energy man-portable systems will not have similar
sustained power nor are they likely to be as reliable in extreme battlefield
environments. Notwithstanding these caveats, directed energy weapons
will continue to evolve and potentially offer a significant technology
advantage against a peer adversary, especially against area denial
systems such as integrated air defense networks and hypersonic
antiship ballistic missiles.

Conclusion

As our forward-looking document, Australia in the Asian Century
states, “predicting the future is fraught with risk, but the greater risk is in
failing to plan for our destiny. As a nation, we face a choice: to drift into our
future or to actively shape it.”18 In a region that is increasingly dependent
on its maritime, air, and land access as a key element to support national
sovereignty, the Australian Defence Force must now focus significant
effort on developing the means to conduct expeditionary operations in
addition to maintaining regional access and engagement as part of a
layered approach to global and regional security as well as continental
defense. This amplification will require the Australian Defence Force
to develop strategies and concepts for defeating adversaries’ A2/
AD capabilities as part of its core mission set. And, the well-defined,
resourced, and balanced series of offset strategies mentioned here are
important components to defeat any such mechanism.
A critical question must be: how will Australia afford an offset
system such as that proposed in this paper? What legacy systems may
have to be sacrificed in order to afford such a system? Whether it is
all or part of the offset capabilities proposed, it is clear that Australia’s
17 “US Navy Deploys Laser Weapon to Persian Gulf for First-Ever Combat Mission,” RT,
November 14, 2014, https://www.rt.com/news/205711-us-laser-weapon-persian/.
18 PM&C, Australia in the Asian Century, 1.
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traditional “technology edge” within the Asian region is deteriorating—
and quickly. And given its relatively small military force, the Australian
government must either decide to leap to a technology end state that
reasserts a technology edge or face a loss of global access and influence
due to degraded military capabilities.

